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1Do we need summary and sequential 
sc anning  in (C og nitiv e) g rammar?  
CRISTIA N O  B RO CCIA S A N D  W ILLE M  B . H O LLM A N N   
Abstra c t 
C og nitiv e G ra m m a r postula tes tw o m od es of c og nitiv e proc essing  
for th e struc turing  of c om plex  sc enes, sum m a ry sc a nning  a nd  
seq uentia l sc a nning . G enera lly spea k ing , th e th eory is c om m itted  
to ba sing  g ra m m a tic a l c onc epts upon m ore g enera l c og nitiv e 
princ iples. In th e c a se of sum m a ry a nd  seq uentia l sc a nning , 
ind epend ent ev id enc e is la c k ing , but La ng a c k er a rg ues th a t th e 
d istinc tion sh ould  noneth eless be a c c epted  a s it buys us 
c onsid era ble th eory-interna l ex pla na tory pow er. F or ex a m ple, 
d yna m ic  prepositions, to-infinitiv es a nd  pa rtic iples (e.g . into, to 
enter, entered )  a re d isting uish ed  from  finite a nd  ba re v erbs in 
term s of sum m a ry v s. seq uentia l sc a nning . In th is pa per, w e try to 
sh ow  th a t v a rious th eory-interna l a nd  th eory-ex terna l a rg um ents 
d o not seem  to support th e tw o sc a nning  m od es. In pa rtic ula r, w e 
offer a  d eta iled  ex a m ina tion of c a usa tiv es (e.g . g et, m a k e) a nd  
a rg ue th a t th eir c om plem enta tion pa tterns a re d iffic ult to rec onc ile 
w ith  d ifferenc es in sc a nning . W e c onc lud e th a t th e sta tus of, a nd  
need  for, sum m a ry a nd  seq uentia l sc a nning  in ( C og nitiv e) 
g ra m m a r is d oubtful, espec ia lly if g ra m m a r is a pproa c h ed  from  th e 
v iew point of th e la ng ua g e lea rner/user. I t follow s a lso th a t th e 
pa rc elling  of som e form -func tion m a pping s m a y prov e less c lea r-
c ut th a n prev iously a ssum ed . 
K eyw ord s:  C og nitiv e G ra m m a r;  sum m a ry v s. seq uentia l 
sc a nning ;  w ord  c la sses;  c om plem enta tion; usa g e-
ba sed  m od el 
1. Cognitive abilities :  s um m ar y  and s equential s c anning 
O n e  o f  th e  m a in  a s s u m p tio n s  o f  L a n g a c k e r ’ s  C o g n itive  G r a m m a r  
( L a n g a c k e r  19 8 7 , 19 9 1, 19 9 9 , 2 0 0 2 )  is  th a t g e n e r a l c o g n itive  
2abilities shape language.
*
 A  case in point is figure/ground  
segregation. Consid er the ex amples in (1) (see Croft and  Cruse 
2004: 5 6  and  T almy 2000: 3 14): 
(1)  a. T om is near J ohn. 
b. J ohn is near T om. 
c. T he bike is near the house. 
d . ? ? T he house is near the bike.  
(1a) and  (1b) seem to show that near is a symmetrical preposition. 
Its trajector and  land mark, i.e. Tom and  J ohn respectively in (1a), 
can be swapped  around  as in (1b) and  the resulting sentence is still 
perfectly acceptable. H owever, if the same operation is performed  
on (1c), the result is, und er normal circumstances, an awkward  
sentence. T he contrast in acceptability between (1c) and  (1d ) can 
be motivated  on ground s of figure/ground  organisation. A ll other 
things being eq ual, we select a smaller object (e.g. a bike rather 
than a house in (1c-d )) as figure, that is (roughly) as the focus of 
our attention (see U ngerer and  Schmid  1996 : Chapter 4 for an 
overview on figure selection; see Langacker 1987: 125 , especially 
note 12, on the d ifference between figure and  focus of attention). 
A mong the linguistically relevant cognitive abilities invoked  by 
Cognitive Grammar are also two mod es of cognitive processing for 
the structuring of complex  events: summary scanning and  
seq uential scanning, which pertain to processing rather than 
conceived  or objective time (Langacker 1987: 144–145 , 248–
249).1 In other word s, they concern our conceptualisation of time 
ind epend ently of how things might occur in the “ real”  world . W e 
will now move to a closer ex amination of the two types of 
scanning and  their crucial importance for the “ architecture”  of 
Cognitive Grammar. 
Suppose we have a complex  scene, that is an event mad e up of 
d ifferent configurations (or component states) over time. F or 
ex ample, the verb enter evokes a complex  scene in that it d enotes 
(or “ profiles”  in Cognitive Grammar terminology) the movement 
of an entity (the trajector) toward s a location (the land mark) 
resulting in the trajector’s end ing up insid e the land mark. T he 
event is d iagrammed  schematically in F igure 1 below (the d otted  
lines ind icate referential id entity between the trajectors/land marks 
of the component states; the three d ots ind icate that only a 
representative subset of all component states has been d epicted ). 
3Cognitive Grammar claims that an event (like enter) is scanned 
sequentially when the conceptualiser (i.e. the language user) views 
the different facets of the complex scene successively (as in a 
motion picture). Further, when a relation involves sequential 
scanning we say that the relation has a positive temporal profile
which is indicated by the heavy TIM E  line in Figure 1.
Figure 1 
B y contrast, summary scanning obtains when the different facets of 
the complex scene are made available as a single Gestalt (as in a 
photo). Suppose a ball falls vertically. Sequential scanning for such 
an event is represented in Figure 2a, while the import of a 
summary scanning construal is depicted in Figure 2b. A short, 
incremental build-up phase precedes the availability of the final 
Gestalt.2 In summary scanning the positions occupied by the ball 
over time are superimposed upon each other so that a holistic 
conceptualisation—all positions are activated simultaneously—
obtains (the downward arrow in the final component is a visual aid 
representing downward motion explicitly). For discussion of the 
presence vs. absence of a temporal profile (heavy vs. light time 
arrow) see our description of Figure 5, below. 
Figure 2  
In what follows, we will present evidence against (the need to 
posit) the summary vs. sequential scanning distinction. Section 2 
shows that the two modes of scanning are important  for theory-
internal reasons. The distinction between summary and sequential 
scanning buys the Cognitive Grammarian considerable theory-
internal explanatory power in that it allows her/him to distinguish 
on semantic grounds between apparently synonymous verbs and 
prepositions (section 2.1). Further, to-infinitives and gerunds are 
also neatly classified on the basis of semantic criteria alone if the 
two modes of scanning are taken into account (section 2.2). 
However, the remaining sections of the paper will discuss issues 
that challenge the value of the summary vs. sequential scanning 
distinction. Section 3 is a case study on the issue of variation in 
infinitival complementation patterns with causative verbs. An 
adequate account can be achieved by relying on the well-
established notions of semantic/syntactic binding (Givó n 1980, 
1990). That is, we argue that scanning would not increase the 
4explanatory power of our analysis and, if it were invoked, would in 
fact raise questions which may turn out to be very difficult or even 
impossible to answer. Section 4 presents further problems that the 
postulation of summary and sequential scanning faces. In section 5 
we propose that the distinctions that scanning is intended to capture 
should be rethought from the viewpoint of the language 
learner/user rather than the professional linguist and that the 
parcelling of some form-function mappings may prove less clear-
cut than previously assumed. In section 6, finally, we take sides 
with Taylor (2003a, b), as regards the potentially conflicting dual 
nature of Cognitive Grammar as an epistemic model and a usage-
based model. We conclude the paper by showing that Langacker’s 
(2006, p.c.) position on scanning may actually be considerably 
more sophisticated than his published discussions would seem to 
suggest, but we argue that usage should be brought to the fore even 
more than is presently the case.   
2. Why scanning is needed in Cognitive G rammar 
In this section, we will argue that the two types of scanning are 
needed first and foremost for theory-internal reasons, a point which 
is recognised explicitly by Langacker himself but is usually 
ignored in the literature (e.g. Croft and Cruse 2004: 53–54, Taylor 
2002). The problem here is that theory-internal coherence does not 
necessarily guarantee a psychologically plausible linguistic theory. 
In order to validate the distinction between the two scanning modes 
external evidence would be desirable  as is indeed commendably 
provided for other basic theoretical notions in Cognitive Grammar, 
such as figure/ground segregation (cf. section 1, above). 
2.1. Enter vs. into 
Among the merits of the postulation of sequential and summary 
scanning is the fact that it allows for the distinction between 
processes and atemporal relations. In order to appreciate this point 
fully, readers who are only partially familiar with the theory should 
consider that Cognitive Grammar defines word classes 
semantically rather than distributionally. Langacker thus assumes 
that any element (including morphemes such as – ing, infinitive 
marker to, etc., which in more traditional theories such as 
Generative Grammar are considered to have grammatical rather 
than semantic import) is meaningful. Every linguistic expression is 
analysed as a pairing of meaning (its semantic pole) and form (its 
phonological pole). 
5The Cognitive Grammar analysis of (the semantic pole of) word 
classes is summarised diagrammatically in Figure 3 (shaded boxes 
indicate concepts that are possible semantic poles for word classes; 
for example, entities, unlike things, do not correspond to any 
particular word class). We start with the very general category of 
entities, which can be divided into things and relations. A thing, a 
technical term in Cognitive Grammar, is a set of interconnected 
entities and is the semantic pole of the noun class. For example, the 
noun team (see Langacker 1987: 197) profiles a set of entities 
(represented in Figure 4a as the dashed boxes connected to each 
other) rather than singling out any constitutive member. The 
emboldened circle visually represents such a set in Figure 4a. 
R elations, by contrast, profile connections between entities (as well 
as the entities themselves), as is shown for two arbitrary entities e1
and e2 in Figure 4b. R elations can be either processes or atemporal 
relations. The former involve sequential scanning, that is, they are 
relations with a positive temporal profile or, to put it differently, 
they are relations scanned as a sequence of configurations. 
Processes, depicted schematically in Figure 4c, constitute the 
semantic pole of verbs (e.g. enter). Atemporal relations have a 
“null” temporal profile and come in two types: stative relations and 
complex atemporal relations. Stative relations involve a single, 
stable configuration through time and correspond to the semantic 
pole of adjectives (i.e. stative relations whose trajector is a noun 
and whose landmark is a region on a scale), adverbs (i.e. stative 
relations whose trajector is a process and whose landmark is a 
region along a scale), and stative prepositions (such as in, as 
opposed to into). Complex atemporal relations (e.g. into) are made 
up of more than one configuration over time but such 
configurations or facets are scanned in summary fashion. 
Figure 3  
Figure 4
Langacker (1992: 290) claims that the contrast between sequential 
and summary scanning is needed, among other things, to 
distinguish between the verb enter and the dynamic preposition 
into.3 R emember that since word classes are defined semantically 
(rather than distributionally) and since the scenarios evoked by 
enter and the motion preposition into are intuitively similar (i.e. 
one entity moves towards another, which is fixed, and ends up 
6inside it), we need a semantic criterion to distinguish between the 
two.
4
 Cognitive Grammar suggests that, whereas enter profiles a 
sequentially scanned relation, into activates summary scanning, i.e. 
the various facets of the denoted event are made available as a 
single Gestalt. A representation of into along the lines of Figure 1 
and Figure 2b is offered in Figure 5.  
Figure 5  
There are two obvious (related) differences between Figure 1 (i.e. 
the schema for enter) and Figure 5. First, each configuration in the 
latter diagram keeps track of the preceding ones as the 
superimposed circles are intended to show. Second, the TIME 
arrow is not heavy because sequential scanning is suspended: all 
facets of the motion event are said to be made simultaneously 
available, i.e. after the build-up phase.  
2.2. Infinitives 
The two types of scanning are also recruited to provide a semantic 
characterisation of bare infinitives (e.g. enter) vs. to-infinitives (to 
enter) vs. gerunds or –ing forms (e.g. entering). The rationale is 
always that differences in form must imply differences in meaning. 
We have already pointed out that bare infinitives are relations 
scanned sequentially. As for to-infinitives, Langacker observes that 
they are not in fact verbs by my definition  instead they designate 
atemporal relations. They nevertheless derive from verbs [ … ]  More 
specifically, the process designated by the verb stem functions as the base 
for the infinitival [ … ]  predication overall. The semantic value of the 
derivational morphology (to (… )) resides in the effect it has on the 
process introduced by the stem: [ it]  imposes its atemporal profile on the 
processual base provided by the stem. (Langacker 2002: 82)
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Finally, –ing forms are also said to be complex atemporal relations. 
Still, “they differ from infinitivals by construing the component 
states of the base process as effectively homogenous and profiling 
only a representative series of the states” Langacker (1987: 249, 
footnote 3). 
Although Langacker’s theory nicely captures the similarities 
existing between to-infinitives (and –ing forms) and adjectives, 
other researchers have offered alternative analyses and raised 
problems for Langacker’s model. D uffley (2003) remarks that the 
7contrast in (2) is left unexplained in Langacker’s analysis. While 
(2a) means that John didn’t forget to lock the door but might have 
no recollection of doing so, (2b) means that he was aware of 
having locked the door. The difference between the two sentences 
obtains naturally if to infinitives are associated with some 
purposive meaning due to the possible (ultimately etymological) 
relation between infinitival to and (motion) preposition to.6      
(2)  a. John remembered to lock the door. 
 b. John remembered locking the door. 
A similar point is made by Pelyvá s (2006). He claims that –ing
forms are not necessarily scanned summarily and, in particular, 
that “since to highlights path and in an abstract sense intention and 
potentiality, its conceptual structure may not be incompatible with 
a similar [i.e. non-summary scanning, CB/WBH] analysis”. He 
also remarks (note 11) that his suggestion may be supported by the 
fact that modal ought and should are very similar in meaning 
although the former takes a to-infinitive and the latter a bare 
infinitive (one might, however, argue that to is becoming fused 
with ought and, hence, no real syntactic difference obtains between 
the two).  
Duffley (2006) offers yet more criticism, in observing for 
instance that in the sentences reproduced below the –ing form 
seems more likely to feature sequential than summary scanning 
(i.e. we intuitively play the events of strolling and tearing in our 
minds as “motion pictures” rather than perceiving them as 
“photos”, see section 1 above).
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(3) The woman strolling down the beach is my mother. 
(4) I found my little brother tearing my photo album to pieces 
in my bedroom. 
Recent research into infinitival complementation by Hamawand 
(2002, 2003a, 2003b) takes the existence of and distinction 
between the two scanning modes for granted.8 By contrast, in his 
analysis of –ing complements, Egan (in preparation) suggests the 
possibility that there may be another processing mode, which he 
dubs “recursive scanning”. He argues that some –ing patterns, like 
(5) below, cannot be described adequately by invoking either 
summary or sequential scanning.   
8(5) I recall her pacing the sitting-room while I am doing my 
homework, pausing every so often to stand at one of the 
windows and look down into the busy street below. (BN C 
HD7 1331)9
In Langacker’s theory, an –ing process implies that its component 
states are always construed as homogenous, i.e. indistinguishable 
from each other. Egan observes that the –ing event described in (5) 
cannot be considered homogenous or at least invites a non-
homogeneous construal because, for example, pauses in the pacing
event are explicitly mentioned. He also seems to suggest that 
sequential scanning cannot be resorted to as the scanning mode for 
the –ing process because only the central portion of the pacing
event, rather than its starting and end points as well, is profiled. 
(Incidentally, it should be pointed out that Egan, by conceding the 
possibility that –ing processes may be compatible with sequential 
scanning, is actually relaxing Langacker’s characterisation of –ing
processes. In Langacker’s theory, –ing processes always involve 
summary scanning alone.) Egan proposes that the type of scanning 
involved in the –ing process in (5) is recursive scanning: we are 
supposed to go through the event in question repeatedly without 
kick-starting it. 
Since Egan’s research is still in progress, it is premature to 
discuss it any further, but it should be clear that not all Cognitive 
Grammarians recognise that the two scanning modes may be 
adequate or sufficient to capture the interpretation of 
complementation patterns. 
Finally, it should also be observed that there seems to be 
disagreement in the case of nominals. Remember (see section 2.1) 
that nominals always involve summary scanning (since they do not 
have a positive temporal profile by definition). Matlock (2004b), 
however, invokes summary and sequential scanning to explain the 
differences in acceptability of nominals in fictive motion 
sentences, i.e. sentences like A trail goes through the desert, where 
a motion verb is used to describe a static scene (see e.g. Talmy 
2000). She suggests that the difference in acceptability between 
(6a) and (6b) may depend on whether the subject N P’s referent is 
scanned sequentially (see (6b)) or not (see (6a)).   
(6)   a. ??The cell phone goes from the cup to the book. 
(phone on desk) 
b.  The cell phone goes from the cup to the book. 
9(phone in ad on billboard) 
Matlock argues that a cell phone is not usually scanned 
sequentially (even if it is unusually long) because “a coherent 
whole can be obtained with just one glance” (2004b: 228), thereby 
explaining the oddness of (6a). Since (a sufficiently large amount 
of) spatial extension is crucial to the acceptability of fictive motion 
sentences, only reference to the cell phone on a large billboard can 
result in an acceptable sentence. Although the confirmation of this 
hypothesis is left to future research, we observe again that the 
notions of summary and sequential scanning are not always used in 
accordance with Langacker’s theory. 
 An additional source of potential confusion is the fact that 
Langacker himself distinguishes various types of scanning other 
than the summary and sequential modes. First of all, scanning is 
sometimes used in the very general sense of the operation 
connecting the standard and the target in acts of comparison (see 
e.g. Langacker 1987: 102). Second, in discussing spatial bounding 
and shape, Langacker uses the terms “field scanning”, “expanse 
scanning”, and “periphery scanning” (the interested reader is 
referred to 1987: Ch. 5, section 4). Third, Langacker’s analysis of 
what is widely known as fictive motion (see e.g. Matlock 2004a, b; 
Talmy 1983) involves a contrast between perfective and 
imperfective virtual motion, see, respectively, examples (7–8) 
below (from Langacker 2005: 175): 
(7) The path is rising quickly as we climb. 
(8) The path rises quickly near the top. 
For these two sentences Langacker provides the following 
schematic characterisations: 
Figure 6  
We note that Figure 6a is similar to the visual representation of 
sequential scanning, and that Figure 6b is similar to summary 
scanning (see Figure 2, above). However, Langacker does not 
make any overt connection with these two scanning modes. 
Moreover, he does not state explicitly what the diagrams portray: 
the verb rising/rises alone or the clause as a whole. This is 
problematic because in terms of summary and sequential scanning 
we would expect rising to invoke summary scanning, and rises to 
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be scanned sequentially. In our view, which is agnostic as to the 
status of summary and sequential scanning, Langacker nonetheless 
makes an important point in analysing example (7) as implying a 
local view, and example (8) as “tak[ing] a global view” of the 
situation (2005: 176). This is in line with the standard view that the 
progressive imposes an internal view on an event in that the 
temporal boundaries of the event are ignored (see e.g. Comrie 
1976: 4; for an earlier expression of the same view see e.g. 
Charleston 1960: 162).10
Finally, it could be claimed that summary scanning is also 
needed to distinguish nominalisations of verbs, see e.g. Something 
exploded vs. There was an explosion (Langacker 2002: 98).11 The 
exploding event in the latter sentence is said to be scanned 
summarily. We agree with Langacker that “[n]ominaliz ing a verb 
necessarily endows it with the conceptual properties characteristic 
of nouns” (2002: 98) but we would dissociate reification of events 
from the question of scanning. This is also done, for example, by 
Croft (2001: 88), who analyses action nominals as action words 
used in the discourse prepositional act of reference, i.e. without 
invoking summary scanning as defined by Langacker.12     
2.3 . Theory-internal reasons 
Langacker himself is aware of the somewhat speculative nature of 
his analysis (1987: 235–254), see also his more recent reiteration 
(1999: 223) that the distinction between summary and sequential 
scanning has not been verified experimentally yet. Nonetheless, 
Langacker (1987) defends his analysis by claiming that summary 
and sequential scanning are primarily needed in order to achieve 
theory-internal coherence. The relevant passage is worth quoting 
(almost) in toto: 
A hard-nosed linguist will doubtless ask for evidence to support these 
claims. How can one prove that the conception of a process (hence the 
meaning of every verb) requires sequential scanning […]? The request for 
justification is certainly legitimate, but we must take some care that the 
form of the request does not embody methodologically unreasonable 
expectations. In particular, one cannot reasonably expect or demand the 
existence of direct empirical evidence that bears on this question alone 
considered in isolation from the overall descriptive context in which the 
analysis of processes is embedded [emphasis ours]: I can no more 
substantiate the claim that verbs imply sequential scanning—directly, and 
without regard to how the total descriptive system meshes together
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[emphasis ours]—than the proponent of a more fashionable model can 
prove that movement rules leave traces without explicating the function 
of these constructs as part of a much larger theoretical and descriptive 
framework. The absence of direct and conclusive empirical support is 
unfortunate, but no linguistic theory can provide such motivation for all 
its constructs taken individually. (Langacker 1987: 253) 
Indeed, without recourse to summary and sequential scanning, 
if we only relied on semantic considerations independently of 
distributional facts, it would be less straightforward to distinguish 
between, for example, the motion preposition into and the bare 
infinitive enter (see section 2.1 above, but also section 5 below for 
a semantic account that does take distribution into account). 
We would like to argue that this is not a sufficient reason to 
accept the a priori existence of the two types of scanning without 
some (direct or indirect) evidence. In order to achieve external 
coherence, i.e. a psychologically plausible linguistic theory, all 
linguistically relevant cognitive abilities postulated by Cognitive 
Grammar must be supported by (direct or indirect) independent 
evidence, or at the very least be in principle amenable to 
experimental verification. In what follows, we try to show that 
such support is lacking at present and that various pieces of 
evidence that are available to us, both theory-external and internal, 
render the postulated distinction less than obviously necessary, and 
perhaps even problematic.  
3. A case study: V ariation in causative verbs 
The discussion so far has not referred to much linguistic data, but 
the linguistic facts themselves suggest that the sequential vs. 
summary scanning distinction is problematic  at least the way in 
which Langacker has related this distinction to the data. 
Specifically, the suggestion that bare infinitives (usually called 
stems in Langacker’s work) feature sequential scanning while 
marked (i.e. to-) infinitives involve summary scanning is difficult 
to maintain in the face of verb (or construction) classes where there 
is variation in complementation patterns (see also Pelyvás’s 2006 
observations mentioned in section 2.2). Let us consider the 
variation in causative verbs here:
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(9) He had his secretary order some coffee, then closed the 
door and sat down behind his desk. (BNC ECK  2589) 
  
12
(10) The police got him to confess to the crime. (BNC HX G 
799) 
On Langacker’s account, in causative constructions such as have or 
make the bare infinitive caused event is processed by means of 
sequential scanning, while in get, cause, force or persuade the 
lower clause event is accessed through summary scanning. It is 
difficult to accept Langacker’s proposal especially in the light of 
accounts of the meaning and form of causatives that are less 
resistant to testing against empirical facts. Givón’s (1980, 1990) 
discussion, based on the crosslinguistically valid notion of binding, 
is a case in point. Binding relates not only to causatives but also to 
“modality verbs” (want, succeed, start, etc.) and “cognition-
utterance verbs” (think, say, etc.) (Givón 1980: 333). It is defined 
as the extent to which the matrix and lower clause events are coded 
and conceptualised as a single, integrated event. Thus, binding has 
a syntactic and a semantic dimension. They correlate as follows: 
“The higher a verb is on the [semantic] binding scale, the less 
would its complement tend to be syntactically coded as an 
independent/main clause” (Givón 1980: 337). This correlation is 
iconically motivated by the proximity principle: linguistic distance 
may be used to mirror conceptual distance (e.g. Haiman 1985: 
102–147). Regarding the use of subordinating complementisers 
such as that, or indeed to, Givón writes: 
All other things being equal, the use of a subordinating morpheme which 
neatly separates the main clause from its complement clause is a coding 
acknowledgement that the two clauses are semantically still independent 
of each other, at least to some extent. (Givón 1980: 371) 
Let us see how syntactic and semantic binding are defined. 
Syntactic binding is the most straightforward. The cross-linguistic 
facts suggest that there are three aspects to coding as an 
independent clause: 
(i) The degree to which the agent/subject/topic marking of the 
embedded-clause agent/subject reflects the marking in 
independent main clauses. 
(ii) The degree to which independent-clause tense-aspect-
modality marking of the verb is preserved in the embedded 
clause. 
(iii) The presence or degree-of-presence of predicate-raising of 
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the complement verb into the main verb; i.e. the degree to 
which the complement verb is lexicalized as one word with 
the main verb (Givón 1980: 337). 
Infinitival complements compared to e.g. that-clauses represent 
rather extreme cases of the reduction of tense-aspect-modality 
marking (Givón 1980: 337)bare infinitives even more so than to-
infinitives. The degree of semantic integration with bare infinitives 
should therefore be at least as high as with to-infinitives. 
Semantic binding is less straightforward because it depends on 
the class of complement taking verbs, i.e. causatives vs. modality 
verbs vs. cognition-utterance verbs. For causatives, Givón 
originally proposed two properties: (i) intended vs. unintended 
causation and (ii) direct vs. mediated causation, i.e. absence or 
presence of an intermediary party in the causal chain (1980: 336). 
Givón (1990: 520–526) adds two further parameters: unity of space 
and unity of time. (Due to the fact that these two factors hang 
together, also with direct vs. mediated causation, these three 
properties represent the typological notion of directness.) The first 
value in each pair represents a higher degree of semantic binding. 
(For modality and cognition-utterance verbs the relevant factors 
involve the extent to which the higher clause subject makes a 
stronger or weaker attempt to achieve the lower clause event, and 
the degree to which they are committed to its success or truth (see 
Givón 1980: 342–347 and passim)).  
In connection with the correlation between syntactic and 
semantic binding it is important to note that the mapping between 
the two is not a simple one, in the sense that the semantic binding 
scale does not allow any absolute predictions concerning syntactic 
integration—only relative predictions: 
If a point on the semantic hierarchy of binding is coded by a certain 
syntactic coding device, then a semantically higher point cannot be coded 
by a syntactically lower point. Rather, it will be coded either by the same 
coding point, or by a higher coding point on the syntactic coding scale. 
(Givón 1980: 370) 
Similar suggestions concerning the form-function mapping in 
causatives and other complex predicates have been made by other 
authors, such as Cristofaro (2003), Dixon (2000), Duffley (1992), 
Fillmore (1972), Fischer (1992, 1995, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 2000), 
Jackendoff (1972), Mittwoch (1990), Wierzbicka (1975). 
14
Hollmann (2003: Ch. 5, 2005) surveys the literature and argues that 
Givón’s factors should be supplemented by three more: 
(iv) presence vs. absence of a sphere of control frame (i.e. of 
the causer over the causee) 
(v) causation type, according to Talmy’s (1976, 1985, 1988, 
2000) four-way typology: affective, physical, volitional 
and inducive causation (see also Croft 1991: 167) 
(vi) punctuality of the causing event 
   
The aggregate furnished by these six parameters is referred to as 
the extended binding hierarchy. As for (iv), the suggestion is that a 
causative situation where the causer inherently controls the causee 
(e.g. socially or physically) is easier to conceptualise as a single 
integrated event than a situation where this is not the case.14 Have 
describes causation against the background of a control frame: 
(11) John had his daughter tidy her bedroom. 
(12) ?Five-year-old Alice had her father tidy her bedroom. 
Force—which significantly takes a to-infinitive—is the opposite: 
the reason why the causer resorts to the use of force is that there is 
no implicit relation of superiority between them and the causee. 
 To see how Talmy’s causation types are related to binding 
it is necessary to explain this classification a little. The basic 
hypothesis is that causers and causees are analysed according to 
their animacy, i.e. animate/human vs. inanimate—or mental vs. 
physical, as in the following diagram from Croft (1991: 167): 
Figure 7  
The arrows in this diagram represent the manipulative interaction 
between causer and causee. V erhagen and Kemmer argue that there 
are differences in the degree of semantic binding (which they refer 
to as directness, notwithstanding the more common use in typology 
referred to above) between the four types: 
An obviously important aspect of this model of causation types is the very 
marked asymmetry between entities with a mental dimension (animates) 
vs. those that are merely physical. Animates can only act on animates via 
the intervening physical world, i.e. the model implies that one cannot 
reach into another person’s mind and directly cause him or her to do, feel, 
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or think something. Physical entities are taken to act directly on other 
things; hence the straight arrows in the diagram in Fig. [7], vs. the very 
bent arrow for mental-on-mental causation, and the slightly bent one for 
mental-on-physical. (Verhagen and Kemmer 1997: 71) 
In other words, Verhagen and Kemmer suggest a (partial) ordering 
of causation types such that physical and affective causation are 
easiest to conceptualise as a single integrated event, while 
volitional causation is seen as less integrated, and inducive 
causation features the loosest bond between causing and caused 
events: 
physical, affective< volitional< inductive 
As for punctuality, finally, the hypothesis is that this has an impact 
on binding in that an instantaneous causing event is construed as 
more integrated with the caused event than is a causing event that 
is seen as being stretched out over an extended period of time. 
Using data from the FLOB corpus15 Hollmann (2003, 2005) 
shows that this aggregate of factors adequately “predicts” the 
complementation pattern (bare vs. marked infinitive) in cause, 
force, have, get, make and persuade. All tokens of these causatives 
were collected, and scored for the various semantic binding 
parameters. While there was not always complete consistency 
across instances in terms of their semantics, clear patterns 
nonetheless did emerge. Get and persuade, for example, were 
found to describe inducive causation most of the time but not 
always. Causation is of the inducive type in, respectively, 93 and 
95 per cent of the cases, which warrants the conclusion that these 
constructions are prototypically associated with this type. The 
overall results of the analysis are presented in Table 1 below. 
Directness is used in the typologist’s sense of the term, i.e. it 
subsumes unity of time, unity of space, and absence vs. presence of 
an intermediary party. The parameter relationality is a combination 
of intendedness, sphere of control and causation type. The reason 
for grouping these together also lies in their clear interrelatedness. 
Consider for example that in order for causation to be intended, the 
causer must be human, or at least animate. They must also be 
human if the causee falls within their sphere of control, as 
inanimate objects cannot meaningfully be said to control anything.  
Table 1  
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The analysis presented in this table clearly supports the idea that 
semantic binding motivates syntactic binding: have and make, the 
only causatives here that take a bare infinitive, are also the only 
predicates with the maximal scores across all three semantic 
binding parameters. 
As a final note, we observe that a scanning-based account of 
complementation in causatives raises even more questions in 
relation to the historical development of these constructions. In 
Middle English there was a considerable amount of variation in 
infinitival complementation in causatives, see e.g. the examples of 
make, below, both of which were obtained from the earliest Middle 
English subperiod (1150–1250) of the Helsinki Corpus.16 More 
instances of this variation can be found in e.g. Visser (1973:  2256–
2284), the O xford English D ictionary (O ED ) and Hollmann 
(2003).  
  
(13) Sunnedei aras ure drihten from deð e to liue. and makede 
arisen mid him alle þ a þ et him efden er ihersumed. (HM1 
IR HOM LAMB14 141) 
‘On Sunday Our Lord arose from death to life. And he 
made arise with him all those who had formerly obeyed 
him.’ 
(14) lo þ e sweoke hu he walde makien hire aleast to leapen in to 
prude. (HM1 IR RELT ANCR 121) 
‘Lo the traitor, how he wanted to make her at last jump 
into pride.’ 
After Middle English a regulation process set in, whereby 
complementation in causatives became more or less fixed. (This 
process was completed in c.1800.)  
Langacker’s characterisation of bare and marked infinitives in 
terms of the two scanning modes is made with reference to 
examples from Present-day English. One might wish to argue that 
in older varieties this distinction did not obtain, but that 
immediately raises the question as to how the present-day situation 
came about. If we assume, by contrast, that the two infinitival 
modes did correspond to different scanning modes in 18th century 
English and before, then the implication is that speakers had a 
choice (in some sense) in their construal of the lower clause event, 
i.e. as scanned summarily or sequentially. The problem, once 
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again, is that this claim cannot be tested. Moreover, given that by 
around 1800 the variation in complementation had pretty much 
disappeared, one would have to explain why this freedom of 
construal was lost, taking account of the fact that some causatives 
came to be associated with lower clause sequential scanning (have, 
make), while some other causatives (cause, force, get, persuade) 
became linked to summary scanning. 
Hollmann (2003: Chapter 5) offers a possible explanation that 
makes no reference to a difference between scanning modes. 
Whilst this is not the place to go into a lot of diachronic detail we 
note that one factor in the regulation process may have been the 
relative frequency of the constructions. It is widely accepted in the 
usage-based model and grammaticalisation theory (see e.g. Bybee 
and Scheibman 1999), that high token frequency constructions will 
tend to get reduced more than low frequency ones. Soon after its 
rise in the Middle English period causative make with an infinitive 
became the most frequent causative, which may help explain why 
it ended up with the relatively compact bare infinitival pattern as 
against the longer to-infinitive complement. (For periphrastic 
causative have, which has always been less frequent, the 
explanation must rely more on the semantics of the construction.)    
4. Further challenges  
The previous section has shown that complementation patterns 
with causative verbs can be explained satisfactorily without 
resorting to the notion of scanning. In fact, if summary and 
sequential scanning were appealed to, the analysis would raise 
various questions potentially very difficult to answer. In order to 
show that the postulation of summary and sequential scanning has 
important repercussions not only for specific cases like 
complementation patterns but also for the whole theory of 
Cognitive Grammar, we now turn to further challenges, both 
theory-internal and theory-external.  
Let us first reiterate the point made in section 2, that, to the best 
of our knowledge, no psycholinguistic evidence is available which 
confirms the existence of the two types of scanning (nor is there 
evidence for Egan’s (in preparation) third mode, of course, since it 
has just been proposed). For example, experiments carried out by 
Catherine Harris of Boston University proved inconclusive (Harris 
2002, p.c.).
17
 Matlock’s research on fictive motion, mentioned in 
section 2.2, may be a potential source for evidence bearing on the 
distinction between the two scanning modes. Here, we would like 
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to make the more general point that, although Matlock (see e.g. 
2004a, b; Matlock et al. 2005) demonstrates that mentally 
simulated motion is involved in fictive motion processing, she 
observes that at the present stage of our knowledge the question of 
how we actually simulate motion while processing fictive motion 
sentences cannot be answered. In fact, she suggests three 
possibilities: (a) we activate a static linear or path-like model and 
later simulate movement along that path; (b) the path 
representation is built gradually; (c) we do not simulate motion, as 
in (a), or scanning, as in (b), but a state change, i.e. we imagine a 
series of points along the path, each a few milliseconds after the 
other. To our mind, (a) might correspond to Langacker’s summary 
scanning and (b) to sequential scanning, while (c) does not seem to 
be contemplated in Langacker’s theory. Importantly, not only is it 
impossible at present to distinguish among the three options 
experimentally but Matlock also suggests that people may actually 
combine the three types.  
To throw the lack of experimental evidence into relief, consider 
that other linguistically relevant cognitive processes, such as 
prototype and schema-based categorisation and figure-ground 
segregation, have been well-documented prior to their use in 
Cognitive Grammar theorising. The summary vs. sequential 
scanning distinction, by contrast, almost twenty years after it was 
postulated, still awaits experimental confirmation. This is 
especially striking given the status of these modes as basic
cognitive operations (i.e. they are not regarded as being reducible 
to a complex of more basic cognitive operations, at least in our 
understanding of Langacker’s theory). It is perhaps not surprising 
that summary and sequential scanning have attracted (sometimes 
strong) criticism before, for instance by Francis (2000), who 
characterises these modes as “highly esoteric concepts for which 
there could be no counterexamples” (ibid: 100, also cited in Taylor 
2002: 516). 
We would like to point out that the postulation of summary and 
sequential scanning may be an instantiation of the post hoc propter 
hoc fallacy. Sequential scanning in grammar implies that an 
element X can be inflected (e.g. enter can be inflected for 
person/tense as in (she) enters). But, if we do not provide some 
language-independent evidence for its existence, we know that X 
evokes sequential scanning only from the fact that X can be 
inflected. Further, if tense inflections are a valid criterion for 
establishing whether a form involves sequential scanning, what 
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does that imply for languages where verbs are not inflected for 
tense, e.g. Thai, Vietnamese and Malay? One suspects that the 
summary vs. sequential scanning distinction may be hard to 
maintain in the face of evidence from these languages. 
The issue of psychological plausibility should also be 
addressed. Consider, for example, Langacker’s (1991: 199) 
analysis of the verbal group have been being followed of sentence 
(15), which is reproduced in (16):  
(15)  I may very well have been being followed. 
(16)  (have (PERF4 (be1 (-ing (be2 (PERF3 (V)))))))   
In other words, we start with the temporal relation symbolised by 
follow (i.e. V), which by definition involves sequential scanning, 
and combine it with PERF3, thus obtaining an atemporal relation, 
i.e. the participial form followed, which requires summary 
scanning (for simplicity’s sake we will not offer a detailed 
description of the semantic pole of the various (indexed) 
morphemes contained in (16) since this is not pivotal to our 
argument). Followed combines with be2 to derive the temporal 
relation be followed. B e followed merges with the morpheme -ing, 
which atemporalises the relevant relation again. Sequential 
scanning obtains when being followed fuses with be1, thus giving 
rise to be being followed. Next, PERF4 imposes summary scanning 
on the resulting predicate been being followed. Finally, the relation 
is re-temporalised thanks to perfective have. In sum, verb groups 
like those in (15) originate from the cyclical application of 
summary and sequential scanning, resulting in the compositional 
path summarised in (16). One may wonder what the psychological 
reality of such cycles is: do speakers really alternate between the 
two types of scanning? If much in grammar is accessed as a unit 
(i.e. automatically or without much constructive effort), as 
Cognitive Grammar itself claims, speakers could/should have 
access to the schematic structure(s) underlining instantiations like 
the one in (15) without having to go through the “generative” 
procedure elucidated in (16), i.e. without constantly having to 
“switch” summary and sequential scanning construal on and off. In 
fact, Langacker himself suggests that the pattern in (16) (or some 
of its subpatterns) may be stored as a unit (1991: 227). If we 
interpret this as an indication that (some?) speakers do not need to 
run through the entire cycle of alternating scanning modes, instead 
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selecting the appropriate scanning mode immediately, the question 
still remains as to how they acquire this knowledge in the first 
place if not through instances of this kind of oscillation (see also 
the point above on the post hoc propter hoc fallacy).
18
  
It is worth dwelling further on the analysis of (15). As it stands 
in (16), it is also not clear, when the scanning mode oscillation 
applies, whether (16) is intended to capture processing on the part 
of either the speaker or the hearer (or both). Since Langacker’s 
theory is a cognitive theory of language, any explanation Cognitive 
Grammar offers must be compatible with psycholinguistic 
evidence. Although processing is a highly contentious issue, 
particularly in the case of speech production, we will try to argue 
that in either case the evidence available to us casts doubts on the 
appropriateness of Langacker’s analysis for (15) as a cognitively
plausible processing representation. 
Let us suppose that the analysis offered in (16) applies to 
processing on the part of the hearer, i.e. comprehension. This 
would mean that we, as hearers, would begin processing the verbal 
group at the penultimate morpheme (i.e. follow). We would then 
move to PERF3. But if we have not processed any of the preceding 
forms at that stage, it is not clear how we could analyse followed as 
a participle  scanned summarily  , as it is syncretic with the 
simple past  which involves sequential scanning. A more 
plausible analysis of the way hearers process sentences like this 
starts from the widespread recognition, in cognitive psychology, of 
the so-called immediacy of interpretation, i.e. the notion that 
sentence processing is done to a large extent by assigning 
syntactic/semantic interpretations to words as they come in, as 
opposed to only at the end of the sentence. Immediacy of 
interpretation is supported by important experiments carried out in 
the 1970s and 1980s, see e.g. the study of eye movements by Just 
and Carpenter (1980), or the computational simulation experiments 
by Reddy (1975, 1980). For an overview of the literature the reader 
is referred to e.g. Barsalou (1992: 243–244 and passim) or 
Anderson (1995: 383–385). With reference to example (15), the 
psycholinguistic evidence suggests that already after hearing the 
very first auxiliary, may, the hearer will hypothesise that this is the 
beginning of a verb phrase (see also Barsalou 1992: 234 on 
identifying constituent types in real-time language processing). The 
subsequent auxiliaries and finally the lexical verb followed will 
confirm this hypothesis, and in identifying the latter verb as a past 
participle rather than a simple past, the hearer is obviously helped 
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considerably by the knowledge that the preceding verb, being, may 
be a passive auxiliary, which requires a past participle to 
complement it. Thus, if instead of Langacker’s perspective we take 
the view that is congruent with the experimental evidence available 
on speech comprehension, the syncretism problem does not arise.  
Having shown that Langacker’s analysis of (15) does not seem 
to be consonant with experimental evidence on comprehension, we 
may hypothesise that it must apply to production. Due to 
methodological problems we have far less experimental evidence 
bearing on language production than we do for comprehension. 
Much of the evidence we do have involves speech errors (e.g. 
Fromkin 1971, 1973; Garrett 1975, 1980, 1988). Despite its 
indirect nature, this evidence clearly points in certain directions 
that suggest that Langacker’s compositional path for sentences 
such as (15), above, cannot be assumed for the production 
dimension of usage either. It is not appropriate here to give a full 
overview of the literature on language production (but see e.g. 
Clark and Clark 1977: Chapters 6–7; Dell 1986; Levelt 1989).19
Simplifying matters considerably, we can say that, disregarding 
some differences between the various models, most 
psycholinguists agree that language production involves several 
stages or levels, moving from the purely conceptual (propositional) 
level, via semantics and syntax, to phonology and ultimately 
phonetics.20 And, importantly, neither on the conceptual level nor 
on the semantic and syntactic levels does it seem to be the case that 
speakers start out at the lowest level of constituency, and then work 
their way up, step by step, in the tree or hierarchy. With reference 
to example (15), when on the conceptual level we form the 
proposition we intend to convey there is no reason why we should 
start with the event corresponding to follow. Instead, the 
proposition is likely to be a single Gestalt involving (some 
modalised version of) someone following the speaker. As regards 
the stages of the process where the message is converted into 
language, the consensus opinion among psycholinguists is that 
high-level schemas—such as in this case the transitive frame of 
follow and of the English passive construction—are evoked very 
early, and that the semantic representations corresponding to the 
entities and relations of the propositions are slotted into place. 
These semantic representations are associated with words. 
Generally, lexical words are assumed to be inserted into the 
structures/schemas earlier than function words. This might seem to 
provide support for Langacker’s suggestion concerning example 
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(15), that the compositional path starts at the lexical verb follow. 
However, this support is only partial at best, as it is not clear why 
the speaker should subsequently insert the auxiliaries in the exact 
order Langacker stipulates. Moreover, the fact that a high-level 
schema such as that of the English passive is activated relatively 
early means that the hierarchy is not assembled in the strictly 
bottom-up manner of the hypothesised compositional path given in 
(16). We thus conclude that from the point of view of the speaker, 
too, compositional paths involve top-down processing as well. 
Of course, one could claim that the compositional path in (16) 
is a convenient representation of the interaction between the two 
scanning modes and does not reflect how, for example, speakers 
actually build up (or decode) sentences like (15) – see above on 
Langacker’s (1991: 227) suggestion that (parts of) (16) may have 
unit status and see e.g. Langacker (1999: Ch. 5) for hints as to non-
strictly bottom-up compositionality which may be consonant with 
the psycholinguistic evidence mentioned here (but note that such 
observations seem to apply only to production rather than 
comprehension). However, both unit status and non-strictly 
bottom-up compositionality, presumably two sides of the same 
coin, are obviously compatible with a model which dispenses with 
the existence of the two scanning modes. In fact, unit status and 
non-strictly bottom-up compositionality “hide” scanning 
oscillations, making it all the more difficult to prove their existence 
and their scope of application (vis-à -vis unit status). As was the 
case with causative verbs (see section 3), the postulation of the two 
modes does not render our explanations more effective but, rather, 
adds a conceptual dimension for which evidence seems to be very 
elusive (at least at present). 
Indeed, the issue of the postulation of summary and sequential 
scanning may blur the distinction between language as an object of 
investigation on the part of the professional linguist and language 
as a cognitive representation in the speaker’s mind (cf. Croft 1988; 
Sandra and Rice 1995), although Cognitive Grammar aims at 
developing a psychologically plausible linguistic theory. This point 
is explicitly acknowledged by Taylor: 
As was the case with vowels and consonants, there is an important sense 
in which the categories of adjective and noun (and indeed the other word 
classes) must be understood with respect to the constructional schemas in 
which they occur (Croft 1999). This is not to deny the possibility of 
entertaining construction-independent characterizations of the word-
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classes, in terms of the nature of the concepts that the words designate, for 
example (Chapter 9). Ultimately, however, a word class emerges as a 
function of its role within a constructional schema. (Taylor 2002: 563) 
The quotation, which is consonant with recent, usage-based 
research into the acquisition of language by children (see e.g. 
Tomasello 2003, who shows that language acquisition relies on 
constructions), brings to the fore the very notion of distributional 
evidence which Langacker had not used to define word classes (see 
section 2).  
More generally, the combination of the desire to see all 
linguistic elements as meaningful and the recognition of 
entrenchement (i.e. the view that because of repetition much in 
language is accessed automatically), constitutes a potentially 
problematic duality in Cognitive Grammar. On the one hand, 
Cognitive Grammar is a semiotic model (see also Taylor 2003b) 
where all elements are said to be meaningful. This requires 
maximum parcelling of meaning. On the other hand, Langacker 
presents Cognitive Grammar as a usage-based model (or corpus 
model, see Taylor 2003a, b). On this view, grammar is emergent: it 
emerges out of concrete forms which an individual is exposed to 
and can manipulate. The issue here is that entrenchment may 
sometimes be in inverse proportion to analysability (see e.g. Croft 
and Cruse 2004: Ch.9 on the relation between conventionality and 
compositionality). The semiotic perspective is linguist-oriented 
(and possibly diachronically oriented), in the sense that the linguist 
motivates the (coming into) existence of a given structure. The 
usage-based view is language user-oriented and may not require 
detailed representations like the one in (16) above.   
5. On enter  and into again 
If we do not accept the existence of the two types of scanning or, 
more cautiously, remain agnostic about them and recognise the 
centrality of distributional facts, we can still solve the nagging 
problem of distinguishing between the verb enter and the dynamic 
preposition into. Distinctions such as those between processes (e.g. 
enter) and atemporal relations (e.g. into) can be regarded first and 
foremost as by-products of distributional facts, i.e. of grammar as a 
usage-based model. The fact that enter is a verb and into is a 
preposition does not (necessarily) either stem from or result in 
different modes of cognitive processing. More important (for the 
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language user) may be the differences in the distribution of the two 
elements.  
 We are not suggesting that into and enter, and spatial 
prepositions and motion/location verbs more generally, are 
semantically identical. Rather, we are claiming that Cognitive 
Grammar can account for their different categorial status even if 
we ignore summary and sequential scanning. Specifically, on the 
reasonable assumption that into (in its motion senses, compare 
fn.4) tends to co-occur with a motion (or transfer) verb such as go,
come, walk, or put, the usage-based model leads one to expect that 
the trajector of into is not simply an entity that moves into a 
container (as is claimed by Langacker, see section 2.1), but is 
actually elaborated by an entity involved in a process of motion 
symbolised by the verb (see also Broccias 2003a: 279–280, 
2003b). Consider Figure 8, below, which represents the semantic 
pole of the sentence She walked into the cinema (the notational 
conventions are those used by Broccias 2003a for so-called change 
constructions). Figure 8b is a compacted version of 8a.  
Figure 8   
The sentence at hand is analysed as involving the conceptual 
merger of two components, see Figure 8a: one symbolised by the 
subject-verb string She walked (depicted as the lower box in Figure 
8a), and the other symbolised by the prepositional phrase into the 
cinema (the upper box). Note that the dashed line establishes a 
correspondence between the trajector of the preposition into on the 
one hand, and the subject of the verb, She, and derivatively the 
whole event She walked, on the other. Now, given that language 
users arrive at their semantic analysis of dynamic prepositions such 
as into on the basis of utterances like the one at hand, i.e. 
utterances where the prepositional phrase depends on some motion 
verb, it seems reasonable to suggest that, as a generalisation over 
all these usage events, the trajector of these prepositions is put in 
correspondence with the trajector of some (schematic) motion 
event. In other words, a (unspecified) motion event forms part of 
the base of into and similar prepositions. This clearly distinguishes 
it semantically from enter and other motion verbs, which 
themselves foreground the motion event, and thus do not feature an 
“extra” component as part of their meaning.  Figures 9a and 9b 
below illustrate our analysis of into vs. enter. The event 
symbolised by the squiggly arrow is not in bold in Figure 9a (as 
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opposed to Figure 8a) because the process it intends to represent is 
not profiled by into but, rather, is part of its base.
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Figure 9  
It should be clear that while this analysis does not rely on the 
distinction between summary and sequential scanning, it is 
nonetheless entirely in the spirit of Cognitive Grammar as a usage-
based model: the difference in semantics between into and enter, 
and between dynamic prepositions and motion verbs more 
generally, emerges in the speaker’s grammar as a result of 
differences in usage.22
Some support for the analysis of into as including reference to a 
schematic motion event is provided by certain “elliptical” patterns 
in non-standard varieties of English. Certain regional varieties of 
English may rely on the preposition alone (not necessarily into) to 
code motion, leaving the verb unexpressed, see examples (17a–b), 
the former taken from Preston (2005), who comments on some 
(unspecified) dialect of American English, the latter from the BNC. 
The suggestion that aspects of semantic structure need not always 
be overtly expressed if they are already schematically present in 
the utterance, and can be filled in using the linguistic or situational 
context, is the accepted Cognitive Grammar perspective on what is 
traditionally known as ellipsis (see e.g. the account of Jerry will vs. 
Jerry will complain in Langacker 1991: 491–492).  
(17) a. I need in the house. 
b. “And you want into his knickers,” he added a little 
laugh to put Gerry at ease. (BNC BN1 1071) 
The idiomatic phrases in (18) illustrate the same idea, but in these 
cases the semi-auxiliaries are absent as well: 
(18) a. Off to bed! 
 b. Into the fray!23
An interesting question is, of course, how the lexemes enter and 
into arose in the first place, given that they profile the same 
dynamic scenario.24 The issue could be generalised to similar cases 
such as cross and across. Our view would simply be that they 
perform different functions. Into allows speakers to talk about 
events of entering while at the same time specifying manner of 
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motion (e.g. She walked into the cinema). Enter, by contrast, may 
be used to refer to these events without specifying manner.        
6. Conclusion 
The discussion has highlighted the problematic nature of summary 
and sequential scanning, whose existence seems to be needed 
primarily in order to achieve internal coherence within a lexicalist, 
semantics-driven linguistic theory. For example, the discussion of 
infinitival complement patterns with causative verbs may not gain 
any obvious advantage from the inclusion of summary vs. 
sequential scanning as an additional dimension of variation. In fact, 
it would raise questions that are very difficult to answer. The 
combination of (an improved version of) syntactic/semantic 
binding and token frequency seems to provide the necessary and 
sufficient ingredients for a satisfactory analysis. Similarly, enter
and into can be distinguished without recourse to summary and 
sequential scanning. In the spirit of the usage-based model, the 
context of use of the two lexemes in question is incorporated into 
their schematic representations, thus allowing us to account for 
their different distributions notwithstanding their perceived 
semantic similarity.     
Cognitive Grammar, although being a lexicalist, semantics-
driven model as was shown in section 2, indeed recognises the 
importance of distributional facts for the emergence of grammar. 
The case of into vs. enter shows that the view of grammar as a 
semantics-driven model and the view of grammar as a usage-based 
model (or corpus model, in the words of Taylor 2003a, b) may go 
hand in hand, but note that on our analysis the lexical semantics are 
clearly grounded in the constructions in which the words in 
question occur. Note, also, that the various infinitival patterns 
observed for causatives point to the difficulty of always parcelling 
meaning into minimal discrete components (so that for example we 
can say that all to-infinitives involve summary scanning and all 
bare infinitives sequential scanning). Taking a lexicalist 
perspective at the expense of attention to the usage data is 
potentially harmful because it may confuse the professional 
linguist with the language user and result in a theory where internal 
coherence is no longer guaranteed. On balance, then, the lexicalist 
aspect of the nature of Cognitive Grammar (where the dictum 
“every form has a meaning” holds sway) compares unfavourably 
with more radically constructional models like Croft’s (2001) or 
Gries and Stefanowitsch’s (e.g. Gries and Stefanowitsch 2004; 
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Stefanowitsch and Gries 2003). Both models recognise a 
continuum between lexical and constructional meaning (mediated 
for example by the strength with which individual lexemes are 
“attracted to”, i.e. occur in, constructions). Furthermore, if the 
proposed meaning of a form escapes experimental validation and 
lacks empirical relevance, then it is probably better not to regard it 
as a cognitively real representation  useful though it might be for 
the professional linguist’s theory-internal purposes. It is also 
conceivable that some structures cannot (any longer) be assigned a 
well-defined meaning on their own but are needed simply to 
guarantee the conceptual integrity of a construction. For example, 
it is unlikely that speakers have a representation of an overarching 
category “subject” along the lines of Langacker (1987), i.e. as a 
primary figure (see also Croft 2001 on the lack of a single 
schematic, i.e. globally valid, characterisation of subject; see also 
Broccias 2006). In terms of the linguistic data we have looked at in 
this paper, to the extent that the loss of infinitival to in some 
complements was (partly) the result of high token frequency, that 
seems to suggest that the infinitive marker to was (re-)analysed in 
such a way that its link with a discrete bit of meaning (presumably, 
a low degree of binding, defined in terms of the parameters 
outlined in section 3, above) was to some extent lost. (For a careful 
discussion of the sense in which constructions may be single 
Gestalts as opposed to being transparent in a perfect morpheme-by-
morpheme way see also the discussion in Croft and Cruse 2004: 
249–254 of Nunberg et al. 1994). In sum, it may be the case that 
abstract representations are sometimes just professional linguists’ 
constructs. Our position in this connection is thus similar to Croft’s 
suggestion in the monosemy vs. polysemy debate, i.e. that 
“[s]peakers do not necessarily make the relevant generalizations, 
even if clever linguists can” (Croft 1998: 168).    
Another important conclusion stemming from the problematic 
nature of summary and sequential scanning is that, if we do not 
include them into the framework, some Cognitive Grammar 
analyses, e.g. of auxiliaries, adverbs (see Nakamura 1997) and 
light verbs (see the contrast between take a fall vs. fall mentioned 
in Langacker 1987: 146), need rethinking since they are to some 
extent based on these notions. More in general, the dual nature of 
Cognitive Grammar  the contrast between the theory-driven 
requirement of full semantic analysability and the role of 
entrenchment in the representation of linguistic structures in the 
speaker’s mind  should be explored in more depth by Cognitive 
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Grammar practitioners. This problem, we believe, lies at the heart 
of the construction of a psychologically plausible, and hence truly 
cognitive, grammar.  
We would like to conclude by observing that Langacker (2006, 
p.c.) suggests that the summary and sequential modes of scanning 
should actually not be seen as two mutually exclusive cognitive 
processes, but rather as opposites on a continuum. Furthermore, he 
argues that while at the highest level of interpretation of a clause 
(i.e. the level of the matrix verb), the difference between the modes 
may be relatively significant, on lower (embedded) levels the 
modes play an increasingly less prominent role (see also Langacker 
1991: 440–441). The view of scanning modes as non-discrete and 
as not independent from the clausal context is to some extent closer 
to the more emphatically usage-based perspective we have argued 
for in this paper, and has far-reaching implications for all the issues 
we raised. 
In relation to complementation, which we illustrated mainly 
with reference to causatives (section 3), Langacker’s (2006, p.c.) 
suggestion means that bare vs. to-infinitival strategies do not 
necessarily invoke different representations of the lower clause 
event at all: the scanning mode is pretty much determined by the 
matrix verb. This would nullify our objections to different 
construals for different complementation modes (synchronically 
and diachronically)—although it would also leave this structural 
contrast between complements unaccounted for.
However, when we turn to the distinction between dynamic 
prepositions such as into and motion verbs such as enter things 
seem less clear. If the scanning mode of a clause is essentially 
determined by the (matrix) verbwhich is almost always finite 
then the question arises as to how, in usage, dynamic prepositions 
could come to be associated with summary scanning. To see that 
this is so, consider that a preposition such as into will usually co-
occur with a motion verb, as in She walked into the cinema (see 
section 5). Now, if the motion verb, in this case walked, effects 
sequential scanning of the situation portrayed by the clause, then it 
is hard to see whence into would derive its summary scanning 
meaning. One might wish to argue that into in isolation features 
summary scanning, which is overridden when combined with a 
finite verb, but we submit that into is not normally encountered by 
the language user in isolation (see (18b) for an exception), and that 
therefore an analysis along those lines would be misguided. 
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To sum up, the view of scanning as gradient  both in terms of 
the summary vs. sequential difference and in terms of decreasing 
prominence from higher to lower levels of clausal organisation 
may be an important step towards solving some of the problems 
associated with a more crude interpretation of the distinction 
between the two proposed modes, but it remains unclear whether 
Cognitive Grammar, as a usage-based model, is well served by 
incorporating the distinction at all.   
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Notes 
*
  We would like to thank Bill Croft, Ewa Dabrowska, René  Dirven, Adele 
Goldberg, Stefan Gries, Ronald Langacker and two anonymous referees for 
their valuable and detailed comments on various versions of this paper. 
Thanks also go to Catherine Harris, Thomas Egan, Z eki Hamawand and 
Teenie Matlock for sending us and/or commenting on some of their recent 
work. All errors, of course, are our own.     
1.  Langacker (1987: 251) claims that in the case of sequential scanning 
processing time corresponds to conceived time. In summary scanning this is 
not the case. 
2. Langacker (1987: 251) suggests that the build-up phase may have no great 
cognitive salience. Nor is it necessarily the case “that any substantial amount 
of processing time is required. The span […] may well be instantaneous for 
most practical purposes, and it may be construed as a single point in 
processing time with respect to higher levels of organization” (ibid.). 
However, anticipating the argument in the main text, we note that it is 
difficult to see at the moment how such claims can be confirmed empirically.  
3. Other prepositions that are analysed as profiling complex atemporal relations 
include across in sentences such as Harvey crawled across the table
(Langacker 1991: 217). However, according to Langacker (1991: 217–218), 
across is polysemous in that it can also profile a simple (stative) relation, i.e. 
in cases where there is no objective motion, e.g. A famous movie star is sitting 
across the table (1991: 217). 
4. It should be borne in mind that we are discussing concrete (i.e. spatially 
dynamic) uses of the preposition into. Non-motion, non-literal examples like 
She is into Construction Grammar do not therefore bear on our discussion.  
5. René  Dirven (2005, p.c.) sharply observes that Langacker does not always 
subsume all to-infinitives under this summary scanning characterisation: “in 
certain of  its uses, including its role in forming noun modifiers (e.g. She was 
the first person to enter the cave) [to] derives from the processual enter a 
predication that, like nonfinite noun modifiers in general, is both relational 
and atemporal; to enter is thus adjectival rather than verbal, though it clearly 
profiles all the component states of its base process” (Langacker 1987: 249, 
emphasis added). The emphasised phrase suggests that some to-infinitives 
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may not involve summary scanning. Interestingly, in the next subsection he 
refers to “complex atemporal relations (e.g. to enter)”, thereby apparently 
choosing not to make this qualification.  
6. Of course, one could argue that Langacker’s analysis just offers a schematic
description of the three types of non-finite verb forms and that the purposive 
meaning associated with the to-infinitive might be the prototypical 
instantiation of the to-infinitive schema. But we will see below that there are 
other reasons to doubt the relevance (and even the existence) of the crucial 
ingredient for its schematic characterisation, namely summary scanning. 
7. Duffley goes on to suggest that the connection Langacker (1991: 91) makes 
between summary scanning and the ability to function as a noun modifier 
leaves unexplained the ungrammaticality of sentences where the bare 
infinitive is used in this function, e.g. *The only person be named was 
Theresa. However, as should be clear from the quotation form Langacker 
(2002) above, it is actually to-infinitives not bare stems that are analysed in 
terms of summary scanning. And to-infinitives can indeed function as noun 
modifiers, cf. The only person to be named was Theresa. Finally, it must be 
pointed out that Duffley does not offer any alternative account of the 
phenomena discussed under the rubric of summary and sequential scanning. 
8. It should also be observed that Hamawand uses the terms temporal and 
atemporal in a different way from Langacker, i.e. in a more traditional 
fashion. Hamawand, in connection with for-to complements for example, 
claims that they convert “a temporal relation [e.g. what is expressed as a that-
clause] into an atemporal one […]. Atemporal denotes a complement clause 
that is not grounded in time” (Hamawand 2003a: 176; emphasis in the 
original). According to Hamawand’s definition, both to-infinitives and bare 
infinitives should be classified as atemporal since neither is obviously 
grounded in time. However, in Langacker’s terminology, to-infinitives are 
said to be atemporal (in that they involve summary scanning) and bare 
infinitives temporal (in that they involve sequential scanning).   
9. BNC stands for British N ational Corpus, a 100 million word corpus of spoken 
and written Present-day English; for more information see e.g. Aston and 
Burnard (1998). The sequence of letters and numbers following this and 
subsequent examples identifies the location of the relevant sentence in the 
corpus. 
10. We are grateful to Nick Smith for drawing our attention to Charleston (1960). 
11. We would like to thank one of the two anonymous reviewers for raising this 
point. 
12. Two more examples of construction variation are seen in the complementation 
of the verb help, as in Sally helped him (to) do the washing-up, and of 
perception verbs, as in I saw them (to) be obnoxious (Bolinger 1974: 66–67). 
Another instance of variation involves the selection of an infinitive vs. a 
present participle, e.g. We saw the ship sink/sinking (Langacker 1991: 442). 
As Langacker himself points out (1991: 443) the crucial difference between 
the two variants resides not in scanning but in the perspective taken on the 
lower clause event, i.e. whether it is external/global, hence requiring an 
infinitive, or internal/local, hence requiring a present participle (see also 
section 2.2, above). 
13. As yet another point of concern, one of the anonymous reviewers and Adele 
Goldberg (2006, p.c.) suggest that summary and sequential scanning are 
essential in Langacker’s account of the difference between each and every. In 
actual fact, Langacker argues that each, unlike every, involves the operation 
31
of “sequential examination” (2003: 6, 2005: 192). Nowhere does he equate 
sequential examination with sequential or summary scanning. 
14. Givón also mentions this factor but he only applies it to non-implicative 
causatives: “non-implicative verbs can already be ranked according to 
Likelihood of manipulator’s authority being challenged by the manipulee, 
with ‘tell’ coding less challenge and ‘order’, ‘ask’, ‘demand’ coding more” 
(1980: 368). 
15. The FLOB corpus is a 1 million word collection of British English written 
prose compiled in the 1990s. More information can be found at 
http://khnt.hit.uib.no/icame/manuals/. 
16. The Helsinki Corpus (diachronic part) is a 1.5 million word corpus covering 
the period from c750 to 1710; for an elaborate description the reader is 
referred to e.g. Kytö  (1991). 
17. Harris devised a computer experiment where she asked subjects to hit a key 
when they had understood the meaning of a sentence. Her dependent measure 
was “understanding time”. However, this method proved insensitive to 
substituting different types of verbs which might be scanned summarily or 
sequentially (under the hypothesis that summary scanning is faster than 
sequential scanning). 
18. We are grateful to Ewa Dabrowska for raising the related question as to how 
children succeed in linking relevant linguistic expressions to the appropriate 
scanning mode. More specifically, assuming that summary and sequential 
scanning are innate cognitive abilities, it is not clear how a child could 
activate the correct scanning mode when, for example, the caregiver says Into 
the box! 
19. Literate language production is in some ways different from speech; see e.g. 
Bereiter et al. (1988), Rosenbaum (1990), Rumelhart and Norman (1982) for 
writing and typing.  
20. The fact that different levels, such as semantics, syntax, phonology and 
phonetics are distinguished (contrary to the Cognitive Grammar postulate that 
only two poles, the semantic pole and the phonological pole, both belonging 
to conceptual space, are needed) is not pivotal to our argument. The crucial 
point, as is made clear below, is the bottom-up vs. top-down processing issue. 
21. Of course there also exists an intransitive variant of enter (e.g. This word 
entered into the English language in the 14 th century) which necessarily 
incorporates the semantic structure symbolised by into as part of its base. 
22. The proposed analysis of into vs. enter is not intended as a comprehensive 
characterisation of (dynamic) prepositions on the one hand, and verbs, on the 
other. For a fuller usage-based account we refer to Croft’s parts-of-speech 
analysis (1991: Chapter 3, 2001: Chapter 2). Here, the major word classes 
noun, adjective and verb are analysed both in terms of what they describe-
viz. objects, properties and actions, respectivelyand in terms of the 
propositional act they are typically used forviz. reference, modification and 
predication, respectively. Adpositions are not explicitly discussed in these 
semantic-pragmatic terms (see Croft 1991: 144–146), but one may argue that 
they refer to relations between entities, and that their propositional act 
function corresponds to what Croft calls “situating” (1991: 111–112), i.e. 
construing the (literal or metaphorical) position of an entity relative to some 
background dimension in space or time. One might wish to observe at this 
point that Croft draws a parallel between his own analysis of verbs and 
Langacker’s account in terms of sequential scanning (1991: 106–107, 121, 
123), thereby endorsing the sequential vs. summary scanning distinction. 
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However, note first that this parallel only applies to dynamic non-stative verbs 
(1991: 107). Second, and more important, Croft actually prefers to interpret 
sequential and summary scanning not as the two Langackerian modes of 
processing a situation, but instead as terms that may be used to describe the 
ephemeral nature, in terms of discourse processing, of an event described by a 
verb, as opposed to the more permanent character of opening and maintaining 
a cognitive file, which occurs when nouns are processed (Croft 1991: 121). 
This is clearly rather different from Langacker’s perspective. 
23. These elliptical patterns are not a novelty in English, see e.g. the following 
examples from Middle English, taken from Mustanoja (1960: 543, 510, 
respectively): 
i. þat ever dard To hym (Pearl, 609–610) 
‘that ever dared (to go) to him’  
ii. and took hire leve, and hom …(Chaucer, Troilus and Criseyde, i, 126) 
‘and took her leave, and (went) home’ 
In other Germanic languages such as Dutch and German the elliptical 
construction is probably even the preferred pattern with modals, at least in 
spoken varieties: Du. Nu moet ik naar huis, G. Jetz t muss ich z u Hause ‘I must 
go home now’. 
24. We are grateful to one of the two anonymous reviewers for pointing this out 
to us. 
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